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Abstract 
Carolyn Korsmeyer has offered some compelling arguments 
for the role of disgust in aesthetic appreciation. In the course 
of this project, she considers and holds up for justifiable 
criticism the account of emotional conversion proposed by 
David Hume in “Of Tragedy” (Korsmeyer 2001, p. 161). I will 
consider variant interpretations of Humean conversion and 
pinpoint a proposal that may afford an explanation of the ways 
in which aesthetic absorption can depend on and be intensified 
by the emotion of disgust. 
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arolyn Korsmeyer has offered some compelling argu-
ments for the role of disgust in aesthetic appreciation. 
In the course of this project, she considers and holds up for 
criticism the account of emotional conversion proposed by 
David Hume in “Of Tragedy” (Korsmeyer 2001, p. 161). 
Hume’s explanation of how it is that tragic works can 
arouse both positive and negative emotions is twofold. He 
relies, as others do, on pointing out that positive and 
negative emotions often take distinct objects, as when we 
respond negatively to tragic content and positively to 
beautiful prose. However, Hume expands his account by 
offering in addition an exploration of how it is that positive 
and negative emotions may interact with and affect one 
another. It is this foray into the manner in which emotions 
combine and intensify one another that is referred to as 
‘emotional conversion.’ Korsmeyer justifiably objects to 
the ambiguity of Hume’s discussion, a criticism that 
gathers support from the number of different readings of 
emotional conversion to which Hume’s essay has given 
rise. I will nonetheless exploit Hume’s discussion by 
considering variant interpretations of emotional conversion 
and pinpoint a proposal that may afford an explanation of 
the ways in which aesthetic absorption can depend on and 
be intensified by the emotion of disgust.  
 
Most of the material in Hume’s essay on tragedy is readily 
and equally applicable to all cases in which a work gives 
rise both to positive and aversive responses. It is by no 
means restricted to tragedy alone. Indeed, many of the 
examples deployed in ‘Of Tragedy’ have more to do with 
melodrama than high art, reinforcing the contention that the 
essay affords a broad range of application. It also seems, as 
Korsmeyer indicates, that Hume’s account is especially 
well suited to explaining the peculiar relation of 
dependency that can exist between disgust and fascination. 
However, Hume’s account of emotional conversion, as 
C 
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Professor Korsmeyer and others have observed, is more 
than a little ambiguous. Hume begins by stressing that our 
enjoyment of works that give rise to passions typically 
considered disagreeable is due to artistry:  
 
By this means, the uneasiness of the 
melancholy passions is not only over-
powered and effaced by something stronger 
of an opposite kind; but the whole impulse 
of those passions is converted into pleasure, 
and swells the delight which the eloquence 
raises in us. The same force of oratory, 
employed on an uninteresting subject, would 
not please half so much, or rather would 
appear altogether ridiculous; and the mind, 
being left in absolute calmness and 
indifference, would relish none of those 
beauties of imagination or expression, 
which, if joined to passion, give it such 
exquisite entertainment. The impulse or 
vehemence, arising from sorrow, 
compassion, indignation, receives a new 
direction from the sentiments of beauty. The 
latter, being the predominant emotion, seize 
the whole mind, and convert the former into 
themselves, at least tincture them so strongly 
as totally to alter their nature. And the soul, 
being, at the same time, rouzed by passion, 
and charmed by eloquence, feels on the 
whole a strong movement, which is 
altogether delightful. (Hume 1987, p. 220) 
 
Even if the nature and function of the above-described 
conversion process is difficult to ascertain, it is nonetheless 
apparent that Hume’s treatment of so-called ‘uneasy’ 
passions is well suited to an analysis of aversive reactions 
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like disgust, whether Hume intended this to be so or not. 
While Hume himself does not identify disgust as one of the 
uneasy passions surveyed, the account offers several 
excellent prospects for forging an alliance between disgust 
and appreciation.  
 
However, there exists an impediment to co-opting Humean 
conversion in an effort to understand the role of disgust in 
aesthetic contexts. One is given momentary pause by 
Hume’s criticism in the same essay of excessive blood and 
gore, something that might be seen as a direct attack on the 
artistic worth of works that arouse disgust: 
 
An action, represented in tragedy, may be 
too bloody and atrocious. It may excite such 
movements of horror as will not soften into 
pleasure; and the greatest energy of 
expression, bestowed on descriptions of that 
nature, serves only to augment our 
uneasiness. Such is that action represented 
in the Ambitious Stepmother, where a 
venerable old man, raised to the height of 
fury and despair, rushes against a pillar, and 
striking his head upon it, besmears it all over 
with mingled brains and gore. The English 
theatre abounds too much with such 
shocking images. (Hume 1987, p. 224) 
 
Whatever conclusions we may draw from Hume’s having 
launched the preceding indictment, we should certainly not 
consider it dated. I read similar criticisms recently, 
concerning a particular production of Titus Andronicus and 
its graphic depiction of the plight of the unfortunate 
Lavinia. Such productions undoubtedly give rise to disgust 
and horror and aversion. It need not follow from this, 
however, that disgust cannot contribute to aesthetic effects. 
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I do not believe that Hume, as Kant did, considers the 
disgusting to be impervious to the transformative effects of 
art (Kant 1951, sec. 48, p. 155). I am convinced, in fact, 
that Hume’s criticism of The Ambitious Stepmother has 
Aristotelian roots (Dadlez 2005). In Chapter 14 of the 
Poetics, Aristotle compares works that arouse emotion by 
means of plot development with those that do so by 
resorting to spectacle alone (Aristotle 1968). Works that 
resort to spectacle to arouse the reactions they do are 
clearly thought to be inferior. So an objection to the kind of 
scene under consideration wouldn’t be to the arousal of 
disgust in itself but to the (quick and dirty) way it was 
aroused. Was the scene included in order to create distress 
without anyone being put to the bother of constructing a 
properly suspenseful or moving plot that could produce 
similar but more profound emotional effects?  Or was there 
a simple miscalculation, resulting in the arousal of a 
negative emotion too strong to be enlisted in the service of 
aesthetic purposes? The latter is another kind of difficulty 
that Aristotle reports may arise when inferior plot structures 
are employed. Hume’s problem does seem to concern the 
spectacle itself, targeting either a miscalculation of effects 
or downright aesthetic sloth. Later in ‘Of Tragedy’ Hume 
indicates that an imbalance in emotional responses inimical 
to aesthetic appreciation is bound to result when stories 
depict the virtuous being crushed ‘under the triumphant 
tyranny and oppression of vice’ (Hume 1987, p. 224). 
Aristotle makes precisely the same point about the 
inferiority of plots that depict the invincibly virtuous falling 
from good fortune to bad (Aristotle 1968, Ch. 13). In either 
case, it is not the arousal of disgust itself that is unaesthetic. 
 
Let us, then, consider what interpretations of the passage 
about emotional conversion are available, and then further 
consider the applicability of those accounts to the particular 
role that disgust might play in aesthetic response and 
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appreciation. An account that demonstrates an occasional 
dependency of appreciation on disgust is particularly 
desirable, so the Humean approach is worth pursuing. It 
provides an alternative to the familiar analysis which points 
simply to different responses to distinct intentional objects 
and remains mute on the subject of the effects that these 
distinct reactions may have on one another. 
 
First, this passage might suggest, as Alex Neill proposes, 
that the conversion is question involves a transfer of 
vehemence or intensity or force from the negative or 
aversive emotion to the positive one. On this account, the 
negative passion does not blink out of existence or get 
replaced by some positive aesthetic reaction, but simply 
intensifies aesthetic absorption and interest without being 
obliterated in the process (Neill 1998). Just as Korsmeyer is 
inclined to claim with respect to some examples, Neill 
resolutely contests the suggestion that positive responses 
eliminate negative ones, and further rejects the idea that a 
passion could retain its identity in spite of a revolution in or 
outright reversal of hedonic tone. Delving into Humean 
terminology, Neill suggests that the term ‘emotion’ does 
not have the same referent as ‘passion’. An emotional 
conversion might, on this account, signify the 
intensification of a predominant passion via some transfer 
of force, insofar as the predominant passion co-opts the 
vehemence of the subordinate.  
 
Alternative readings of the passage are available, of 
course. Amyas Merivale takes talk of conversion to refer 
to ultimate eradication of the aversive passion, the view 
challenged by both Neill and Korsmeyer (Merivale 2011). 
He stresses that such an account would not force us to 
characterize our experience of tragedy or horror or 
suspense as uniformly pleasant—free, that is, of any 
negative or painful emotion. For one thing, Hume 
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specifies neither frequency nor duration when discussing 
conversion. Both positive and negative responses might be 
simultaneously sustained for some considerable period, 
the negative concluding only with the conclusion of the 
work. Negative responses to different facets of the plot 
could reasonably be expected to arise and diminish in the 
course of our appreciating a single work, without this 
diminishment constituting an objection to the approach as 
a whole.   
 
It may also prove possible to accommodate aspects of both 
the preceding insights by focusing on Hume’s use of 
‘tincture’ in describing the ways in which emotions can 
affect one another. Instead of maintaining that the negative 
passion is entirely effaced and aligning conversion always 
with eradication, we have, instead, a metaphor the vehicle 
of which invites us to think of tinctures and infusions, of 
mixtures and combinations and the blending of ingredients, 
of saturation and undertone. Such language can bring to 
mind  transformations that occur in degrees or increments. 
In Neill’s terminology, we could consider variable 
intensities, as of saturation or pigmentation. Hume himself 
uses the metaphor more than once. “Contempt or scorn has 
so strong a tincture of pride, that there scarce is any other 
passion discernable: Whereas in esteem or respect, love 
makes a more considerable ingredient than humility,” he 
states in the Treatise (Hume 1978, p. 390, 2.2.9). In such an 
account, what Hume refers to as a subordinate passion may 
persist, altered but not extinguished by the predominant, or 
may be entirely transformed. That is, conversion, like 
transformation, may admit of degrees. Sometimes the 
negative response is virtually eradicated, and sometimes it 
is not, but merely serves to intensify aesthetic absorption 
and appreciation. Professor Korsmeyer’s concern that 
“Hume’s position… would hardly accommodate the 
instances when disgust remains loathsome…yet is still 
Problem of Disgust and Aesthetic Appreciation | Dadlez 
 
62 
 
profound and worth pondering” (Korsmeyer 2011, p. 161) 
can be addressed by the alternative just suggested, which 
stresses an interdependence that may sometimes but need 
not always signal complete transformation. 
 
I will use three examples from Eve Ensler’s Vagina 
Monologues to illustrate these different degrees of 
transformation with respect to the emotion of disgust. In 
one respect, of course, Ensler’s aim is to lampoon a disgust 
with the female body so pervasive that it sometimes seems 
to extend to the very words used to refer to female body 
parts. In many parts of the U.S., it is not even permissible 
to use the word ‘vagina’ in advertising a performance: ‘A 
theatre in Florida had to change the title of a charity 
production of The Vagina Monologues on its marquee, 
after a woman complained that it was offensive. The new 
name? They decided on ‘The Hoohaa Monologues.’’i One 
has but to read a few advertisements for feminine hygiene 
products from the 1950s to see the point as it is applicable 
to the feminine body itself. The association of the 
disgusting with the feminine, moreover, has a venerable 
history. Kant, for whom disgust can never constitute a part 
of aesthetic appreciation, states that “Nothing is so much 
set against the beautiful as disgust, just as nothing sinks 
deeper beneath the sublime than the ridiculous. On this 
account no insult can be more painful to a man than being 
called a fool, and to a woman, than being called disgusting” 
(Kant 1960, p. 83). In the Kantian scheme of things, 
neatness and cleanliness become feminine obsessions 
because there is a distinctively feminine aversion to 
arousing aversion. This meta-aversion should not strike 
anyone as unfamiliar in the present day. One has but to 
                                                 
i ‘No Vaginas, Please, We’re Floridian, Metro News 8 Feb 2007. 
http://metro.co.uk/2007/02/08/no-vaginas-please-were-floridian-64194/ 
Accessed 26 May 2014. 
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glance at any women’s magazine to note that the majority 
of its pages are devoted to products designed to disguise an 
apparently unacceptable appearance, to mask odor, or to 
stop up infelicitous leakage. Ensler has her work cut out for 
her. Accordingly, some of the monologues are intended 
merely to mock this disgust with the female body and to 
make it ridiculous. The speaker in a monologue about 
vaginal discharge, aptly entitled The Flood, shares this 
disgust. She can’t even utter the word ‘vagina’: 
 
Down there? I haven’t been down there since 
1953. No, it had nothing to do with 
Eisenhower. No, no, it’s a cellar down 
there. It’s very damp, clammy. You don’t 
want to go down there. Trust me. You’d get 
sick. Suffocating. Very nauseating. The smell 
of the clamminess and the mildew and 
everything. Whew! Smells unbearable. Gets 
in your clothes. (Ensler 2001, p. 25) 
 
The speaker goes on to describe an incident during which 
she becomes aroused on account of a kiss. And then a 
terrible thing happens: 
 
there was a flood down there.  I couldn’t 
control it. It was like this force of passion, 
this river of life just flooded out of me, right 
through my panties, right onto the car seat of 
his new white Chevy Belair. It wasn’t pee 
and it was smelly—well, frankly I didn’t 
really smell anything at all, but he said, 
Andy said that it smelled like sour milk and 
it was staining his car seat. I was “a stinky 
weird girl,” he said. (Ensler 2001, p. 27) 
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Done properly, this monologue has the audience howling 
with laughter (especially when the flood, in a dream 
sequence, engulfs an entire restaurant, forcing Burt 
Reynolds to swim for his life). Here there is a near 
eradication of the original aversive reaction. The purpose is 
clearly political: to mock reactions of disgust—both those 
of the speaker and her revolted swain. The purpose is also 
to defuse prissiness and false delicacy about ordinary 
bodily functions. The humor in a proper performance really 
does diminish disgust almost entirely. Of course, this is a 
case where disgust itself is the subject of the monologue as 
well as a response to the things it describes. Still, 
something like the eradication interpretation seems pretty 
adequately to describe the case. 
 
But other degrees of transformation seem to be involved in 
other monologues. Ensler invokes the reaction of disgust 
intentionally and repeatedly in the Monologues, but in 
many other cases the aversive reaction is not at all 
dissipated. Rather, it appears to be vital in sustaining the 
aesthetic effect. A monologue entitled My Vagina Was My 
Village is about Bosnia, and chronicles cases of rape as a 
weapon of war. It alternates between two visions of 
sexuality by twining together the perspective of a normal, 
happy young woman with that of the victim of atrocities. 
The strand of the monologue belonging to the victim 
announces that she does not ‘touch anymore. Not now. Not 
since.’ Each return to her voice and her story is introduced 
by the recurring refrain ‘not since’: 
 
Not since I heard the skin tear and made 
lemon screeching sounds, not since a piece 
of my vagina came off in my hand, a part of 
the lip, now one side of the lip is completely 
gone. (Ensler 2001, p. 62) 
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Our horror and disgust at mutilation mirrors that of the 
speaker. The intention is again political, in that it is clearly 
to rouse in the audience a response of moral outrage not 
just against war and rape but against rape as a military 
strategy. Our aversive reaction to the descriptions in the 
monologue are crucial to the intensity and immediacy of 
the further moral response. Without a description graphic 
enough to arouse revulsion, there would be no anchor for 
the outrage, no deeper sense of the true nature of the 
objection. Disgust is the engine of an enlarged political 
insight.  
 
In yet another case, disgust is used to anchor and to 
energize a celebration of embodiedness. I Was There in the 
Room is a joyous description of birth, with none of the gory 
bits elided: 
 
I saw the colors of her vagina. They changed. 
Saw the bruised broken blue 
the blistering tomato red 
the gray pink—the dark; 
saw the blood like perspiration along the edges 
saw the yellow, white liquid, the shit, the clots 
pushing out all the holes, pushing harder and harder, 
saw through the hole, the baby’s head 
scratches of black hair, saw it just there behind 
the bone—a hard round memory, 
as the nurse from the Ukraine kept turning and turning 
her slippery hand. (Ensler 2001, pp. 122-123) 
 
This example comes closest to the kind of alliance between 
and, indeed, fusion of beauty and disgust that Korsmeyer 
teases out at the conclusion of her book. The ooze and the 
clots, the blood and the shit, are all still what they are. They 
elicit the aversive response they always do. But they are 
also triumphant, the necessary condition for a particular 
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kind of joy, the recognition of which constitutes part of the 
meaning of the work. It is the gross, coarse, smelly 
physicality of the process that is vital to our fully 
embracing it and knowing it for what it is. The disgusting 
remains disgusting but is nonetheless transformed by the 
context in which it is placed.  
 
The preceding suggests that Hume’s speculations about 
emotional conversion can contribute significantly to our 
understanding of how disgust can affect, infect and enlarge 
aesthetic appreciation. It is by examining not just the 
intentional objects of reactions like disgust but the 
interaction of disgust with other emotions and attitudes and 
responses that can explain its potential impact. Disgust can 
enlarge insight, enhance understanding, intensify beauty. 
More work needs to be done in order to give a complete 
account of how such things are possible. But Hume’s essay 
provides us with a starting point from which to launch such 
explorations. 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aristotle (1969). Aristotle's Poetics: A Translation and 
Commentary for Students of Literature, trans. Leon Golden. 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Dadlez, E. M. (2005). “Spectacularly Bad: Hume and 
Aristotle on Tragic Spectacle.” The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 63:4: 351-358. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00217.x 
 
Ensler, Eve (2001). The Vagina Monologues. NY: Villard. 
 
Essays in Philosophy 17(1) 
 
67 
 
Hume, David (1987). “Of Tragedy” in Essays: Moral, 
Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller. IN: Liberty 
Classics, pp. 216-225. 
 
Hume, David (1978). Treatise of Human Nature, edited by 
L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Kant , Immanuel (1960). “Of the Distinctions of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime in the Interrelations of the Two 
Sexes.” In Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime, trans. John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. pp. 76-96. 
 
Kant, Immanuel (1951). Critique of Judgment. Trans. J.H. 
Bernard. NY: Hafner Press. 
 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn (2011). Savoring Disgust: the Foul 
and the Fair in Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756940.001.0
001 
 
Merivale, Amyas. (2011). “Mixed Feelings, Mixed 
Metaphors: Hume on Tragic Pleasure.” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 51: 259–269. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayr013 
 
Neill, Alex (1998). “‘An Unaccountable Pleasure': Hume 
on Tragedy and the Passions’.” Hume Studies 24 (1998): 
338-343. 
